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INTRODUCTION

Missouri traditionally has accepted the validity of mortgages1 to secure
future advances. 2 In 1981, the legislature finally offered a workable and definitive technique for resolving priority disputes between a mortgagee making
such advances and an intervening lienor. The new legislation, Missouri Revised Statutes section 443.055,1 makes it clear that a mortgage to secure future advances is valid and enforceable for a ten-year period. By complying
with the statute, a mortgagee can assure priority for those advances as of the
date the mortgage is recorded. A mortgagee4 who wishes to avoid the strict
requirements of the future advances legislation, or to secure advances for more
than ten years, can opt out of the new statute and be controlled by prior Missouri law. This Comment examines prior Missouri statutes and the judicial
history of future advances mortgages, sets out the requirements of the new
I. As used in this Comment, the term "mortgage" refers to a real estate mortgage, deed
of trust, or any other real property instrument securing a debt. See also Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 443.055.1 (Supp. 1983) (defines "instrument" as "any mortgage, deed of trust, or other real
property security instrument securing the repayment of any debt").
2. See, e.g., Foster v. Reynolds, 38 Mo. 553, 556-57 (1866); see also Embree v. Roney,
152 Mo. App. 257, 262-63, 133 S.W. 83, 85 (1910) (chattel mortgage); Rice v. Davis, 99 Mo.
App. 636, 640, 74 S.W. 431, 432 (1903) (same).
3. (Supp. 1983). The statute originally applied to all real estate mortgages given to secure
future advances, whether or not the mortgagee wished to be governed thereby. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 443.055 (Supp. 1981). It was amended in 1982 to allow mortgagees to opt out of the new
legislation and secure advances for periods longer than 10 years. 1982 Mo. Laws 620 (codified at
Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.055.8 (Supp. 1983)); see notes 95-116 and accompanying text supra.
4. As used in this Comment, the term "mortgagee" refers to any lender or creditor under
any mortgage, deed of trust beneficiary, or creditor holding a real property security interest.
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legislation, and offers some suggestions to guide the mortgagee in making a
choice between the new statute and judicial interpretation of the future advances mortgage.
II.

PRIOR MISSOURI FUTURE ADVANCES STATUTES

A number of prior Missouri statutes permitted future advances in some
form. Some of those statutes merely sanctioned the use of future advances
clauses. 5 Others sanctioned the use of such clauses and set out rules governing
priority problems between advances and other liens. Two such statutes, the
mechanics' lien statute and the Uniform Commercial Code, are still in effect.
A.

The Mechanics' Lien Statute

Missouri Revised Statutes sections 429.0506 and 429.0607 have remained
virtually unchanged since their enactment.8 They give preference to mechan5. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 410.010-.060 (1959) (Accounts Receivable Act) (repealed 1963); id. §§ 430.260-.320 (1949 & 1959) (Factor's Lien Act) (repealed 1963); Id.
§§ 369.010-.665 (1969) (Savings and Loan Act). The Accounts Receivable Act permitted the
assignment of present and future accounts. Id. § 410.010 (repealed 1963). The Factor's Lien Act
permitted security interests in shifting stocks of goods and after-acquired property. Comment,
Legislation-Factor'sLien Act of 1945 and Accounts Receivable Act of 1943, 17 Mo. L. REV.
86, 88 (1952). One who advanced money in return for a security interest in merchandise could
secure all loans and future advances with a continuing general lien that attached to all merchandise described in the written agreement, whether that merchandise was owned at the time of the
agreement or subsequently acquired. Mo. REV. STAT. § 430.270 (1959) (repealed 1963).
The Savings and Loan Act gave savings and loan associations the power to make advances
necessary to protect security or the lien's priority, to make one thousand dollar advances to equip
or furnish the home securing the mortgage, and to make any other advance authorized by a future
advances clause in a mortgage. Id. § 369.365 (repealed 1971).
6. (1978).
7. (1978).
8. Both sections were originally enacted in 1855. Section 429.050 originally provided:
The lien for the things aforesaid, or work, shall attach to the buildings, erections or
improvements, for which they were furnished or the work was done, in preference to
any prior lien, or incumberance [sic], or mortgage, upon the land upon which said
buildings, erections or improvements, have been erected or put; and any person enforcing such lien, may have such building, erection or improvement, sold under execution,
and the purchaser may remove the same within a reasonable time thereafter.
Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 109, § 10 (1855). A later revision removed some superfluous commas, corrected the spelling error, and added "machinery." Id. ch. 102, § 6707 (1889).
Section 429.060 originally provided:
The liens for work or labor done, or things furnished, as specified in this act, shall have
priority in the order of the filing of the accounts thereof, as aforesaid, and shall be
preferred to all other liens or incumberances which may be attached to or upon such
building, erection or other improvement, and to the land on which the same is situated,
to the extent aforesaid, or either of them, made subsequent to the commencement of
said building, erection, or other improvement.
Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 109, § 8 (1855). The statute was later clarified: "The lien for work and
materials . . . shall be preferred to all other incumberances which may be attached to or upon
such buildings, bridges or other improvements, or to the ground, or either of them, subsequent to
the commencement of such buildings or improvements." Id. ch. 47, § 3178 (1879).
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ics' 9 liens over "any prior lien or encumbrance or mortgage upon the land
upon which . . .[the] buildings, erections, improvements or machinery...
[are] erected or put,"10 and permits lienors to sell or remove the improvements
to satisfy their unpaid debts."1 Mechanics' lienors also can gain priority over
subsequent encumbrances on the land under section 429.060.12 The courts
broadly define "subsequent encumbrance" to include future advances, whether
13
the advances are optional or obligatory.
This statute does not set out precise rules of priority between mechanics'

liens and future advances made pursuant to a construction mortgage, but such
rules have emerged through judicial interpretation. Recognizing the impor-

tance of this statutory protection of mechanics, the courts have held that
mechanics' liens are superior to all advances made after the mechanics' lien
arises, regardless of whether the lender was obligated to make the advance.1
Missouri follows the "first spade rule," 15 which dates the priority of all
9. As used in the Comment, the phrase "mechanics' lien" refers to mechanics' and materialmen's liens. These statutory liens give unpaid contractors, workmen, and materials suppliers a
forecloseable security interest in real estate that they have improved. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON, &
D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 12.4 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as NELSON &
WHITMAN]; see R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 25.27
(2d ed. 1981); Comment, Mechanic's Liens-Priority Over Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, 42
Mo. L. REV. 53, 60-61 (1977).
10. Mo. REv. STAT. § 429.050 (1978). This lien has priority over prior liens for improvements but not for the land on which the improvements are made, unless the prior mortgagee has
waived priority as to the land. H.B. Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d
940, 953-54 (Mo. 1967); Union Elec. Co. v. Clayton Center Ltd., 634 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); see notes 44-49 and accompanying text infra.
11. Mo. REV. STAT. § 429.050 (1978). It is usually impractical to exercise this right because removal would reduce the value of the improvements to less than the amount of the lien.
See, e.g., Fleming-Gilchrist Const. Co. v. McGonigle, 338 Mo. 56, 68, 89 S.W.2d 15, 21 (1935),
discussed in Comment, supra note 9, at 61. If there is a superior mortgage on the land, the
mechanics lienor does not have the right to sell the land with the improvements. McGonigle, 338
Mo. at 65-66, 89 S.W.2d at 20-21. By securing a mechanics lien on the land under Mo. REv.
STAT. § 429.010 (1978), the lienor may sell the land and the improvements subject to the first
lien on the land. Comment, supra note 9, at 61-62. Some older cases granted the mechanics lienor
or foreclosure sale purchaser a cause of action for damages if the land owner refused to permit
removal. See, e.g., Seidel v. Cornwell, 166 Mo. 51, 55, 65 S.W. 971, 972 (1901).
12. Prior liens of every kind are generally deemed superior to liens arising later. See H.B.
Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940, 952 (Mo. 1967). Moreover, the
courts liberally interpret the mechanics' lien statute to guarantee payment to those who improve
property. See Drilling Serv. Co. v. Baebler, 484 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Mo. 1972); Boyer Lumber v. Blair,
510 S.W.2d 738, 747 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
Suppose that X hires M to install a conveyor system in its factory. While work is progressing,
X mortgages the property to Bank to raise funds for acquiring adjacent land. If M is not paid, its
mechanics lien attaches when installation is commenced, and thus is prior to the subsequent
mortgage.
13. See, e.g., Drilling Serv. Co. v. Baebler, 484 S,W.2d 1, 10-11 (Mo. 1972).
14. See, e.g., id.; H.B. Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940,
952-53 (Mo. 1967).
15. Schroeter Bros. Hardware Co. v. Croatian "Sokol" Gymnastic Ass'n, 332 Mo. 440,
459, 58 S.W.2d 995, 1002-03 (1933); United Lumber Co. v. Minmar Inv. Co., 472 S.W.2d 630,
632-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Gardner v. North Kan. City Alfalfa Mills, 61 S.W.2d 374, 376
(Mo. Ct. App. 1933); see generally Comment, supra note 9, at 55-57.
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mechanics' liens to the time of the "first visible improvement." 16 Thus, all
mechanics' liens receive priority over future advances made after the commencement of work. 17 This legislation will still control if the mortgagee opts
out of the new legislation 8 or fails to meet its strict requirements.1 9
B. The Uniform Commercial Code
The legislature specifically authorized the use of future advances clauses
in loans secured by personal property when it adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in 1963.20 Misssouri Revised Statutes section 400.9-204(5)
provides that "[o]bligations covered by a security agreement may include future advances or other value whether or not the advances or value are given
pursuant to commitment."2 This section has been broadly interpreted to permit traditional future advances clauses22 (which specify the amount and purpose for which the advance is made) and dragnet clauses23 (which secure payment of "any other indebtedness heretofore, now or hereafter contracted" 24 ).
Priority for advances over intervening liens depends on the circumstances of
16. The first visible improvement
means the visible commencement of actual operations on the grounds for the erection of
the building or the making of the improvement which makes it apparent that a building
has been commenced or that an improvement is to be made, done with the intention
and formed purpose to continue the work until completed.
H.B. Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940, 951 (Mo. 1967). It does
not include "laying off the ground for buildings and driving pegs into the ground to mark the
location ... [or] clearing the ground of ... obstructions, that would render insecure the foundations to be built." Id. at 951 (citing L. BoisoT, MECHANICS' LIENS § 179 (1897)). Nor does it
include preliminary site inspection. Id. (citing Mark's Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Republic Mortgage
Co., 242 Ark. 475, 414 S.W.2d 106 (1967)).
17. See, e.g., Drilling Serv. Co. v. Baebler, 484 S.W.2d 1, 9, 12 (Mo. 1972); H.B. Deal
Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940, 951-52 (Mo. 1967).
18. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.055.8 (Supp. 1983).
19. Mortgages must be carefully drawn to comply with the new statute. Thus, if our hypothetical M begins to install the conveyor system, then Bank makes an obligatory advance pursuant
to a previously executed mortgage without complying with § 443.055, Ms lien is still prior to the
lien securing the advance. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text infra.
20. 1963 Mo. Laws 503. The UCC (1969 version) appears at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 400.1101 to .9-507 (1978 & Supp. 1983). Before the adoption of the UCC, future advances could be
secured by chattel mortgages. See Graham v. Finnerty, 232 S.W. 129, 131 (Mo. 1921); White v.
Meiderhoff, 281 S.W. 98, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926). Value was defined as "any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract ... [including] [a]n antecedent or preexisting obligation,
whether for money or not, . . . where. . . taken either in satisfaction thereof or as security therefor." Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 406.010(12), 407.020(12) (1959) (repealed 1972).
21. (1978).
22. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-4, at 1038-42
(1980). For priority purposes, advances will relate back to the time the agreement is executed. Id.
at 1037.
23. See Kimball Foods v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1977); Community Nat'l Bank v. Victory, 488 F.2d 1369, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1973); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n v. Vrooman, 476 F.2d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 1973); State Bank of Albany v. United
States, 468 F.2d 1211, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
24. Trapp ex rel. First Miss. Bank of Commerce v. Tidwell, 418 So. 2d 786, 787, 792
(Miss. 1982); see generally W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 3.06
(1978).
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the particular case. 25
The UCC separately treats "goods incorporated into a structure in the
manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work, and the like" and
any other goods classified by Missouri law as fixtures. 26 Section 400.9-313 requires a special fixture filing in the real estate records for goods falling into
these two categories. 27 This section also contains special rules governing prior28
ity conflicts between fixtures and real estate mortgagees.
III.

JUDICIAL HISTORY OF FUTURE ADVANCES CLAUSES

Under the new future advances statute, a lender has the option to be controlled by that legislation or to be governed by prior law.2" An examination of
prior Missouri law is necessary because lenders may decide that the new statute does not adequately serve their interests in some situations. 30
A.

Validity

Since 1866, Missouri has recognized the validity of mortgages to secure
future advances. In Foster v. Reynolds,31 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
the right of a mortgagee to foreclose a deed of trust that, on its face, secured a
32
sum to be subsequently advanced.
25. Usually the first to file has priority under § 9-204. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 22, § 25-4, at 1037; see generally Cohen, Future Advance Interests Under the Code, 10
B.C.L. REV. 1 (1969); Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 925.
26. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-313 (1978). Fixtures receive special treatment because they
mix real and personal property characteristics. W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, supra note 24,
§ 2.08; Henning, The Impact of Revised Article 9 on Missouri s Fixture Financing Scheme, 48
Mo. L. REV. 63, 64 (1983).
27. A financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest in fixtures. Mo. REv.
STAT. §§ 400.9-302, -401(l)(b), -408 (1978); Henning, supra note 26, at 82-87.
28. The general rule is that a secured party whose interest attaches before the goods
become fixtures has priority over competing real estate interests. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-313
(1978); Henning, supra note 26, at 90-93. Prior recorded real estate interests take priority over
non-purchase money security interests in fixtures. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-313(4)(c) (1978).
Purchase money security interests perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become a fixture
or within ten days thereafter have priority over real estate interests, unless the real estate interest
arises and is recorded between the time the goods become fixtures and the fixture filing was made.
Id. Under the 1972 Code, construction mortgagees are given special protection by § 9-313(6),
which generally gives them priority over conflicting purchase money security interests in fixtures.
Under Missouri law, however, the construction mortgagee's priority is limited to subsequent advances made or contracted for without knowledge of and prior to the perfection of the purchase
mortgagee's security interest. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-313(4)(c) (1978); Henning, supra note 26,
at 92-93.
29. The statute does not apply to instruments that do not clearly state they they are to be
governed by it. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.055.8 (Supp. 1983).
30. See notes 95-116 and accompanying text infra.
31. 38 Mo. 553 (1866).
32. Although the amount on the deed of trust was $2,625, only $700 had been advanced.
Id. at 555. The parties apparently had executed a second agreement providing for future advances. When the mortgagee brought the foreclosure action, the mortgagor denied liability on the
note on the grounds that the face amount had not been paid and claimed that the collateral
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[A] mortgage or judgment may be given to secure future advances, or as

a general security for balances which may become due from time to time
from the mortgagor or judgment debtor; and this security may be taken in the
form of a mortgage or judgment for a specific sum of money sufficiently large
to cover the amount of the floating debt to be secured thereby."

The Kansas City Court of Appeals, relying on Foster, went even further in
Smith-Wallace Shoe Co. v. Wilson.3 4 The Wilson court stated that a mortgage to secure future advances is "not only valid between the parties, but as
against [subsequent] creditors having notice thereof. . . [and] a mortgage,
duly recorded, would be constructive notice. '3 5 After the Wilson decision, future advances enjoyed priority over liens arising after the advance.3, No Missouri case, however, has expressly decided whether advances made pursuant to
over a lien crea future advances clause in a mortgage will be given priority
3
ated after the initial mortgage but before the advance. 7
B.

Priority

Mortgagees secure future advances in construction mortgages, line of
credit mortgages, and dragnet mortgages.38 With the exception of the conagreement was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. Id. at 555-56. The court rejected both
arguments, holding that future advances mortgages are valid and that parol evidence is admissible
to show the parties' intent. Id. at 556-57.
33. Id. (citing Shirras v. Caig, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 447 (1812) (mortgages may secure
future advances)), discussed in Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L.
REv. 209, 224-25 (1956).
34. 63 Mo. App. 326 (1895), discussed in Blackburn, supra note 33, at 225-26. At least
four cases were decided after Foster but before Wilson: Holmes v. Strayhorn-Hutton-Evans
Comm'n Co., 81 Mo. App. 97, 101 (1899) (chattel mortgage valid to secure future advances);
Williams v. Alnutt, 72 Mo. App. 62, 65 (1897) (mortgagee may show that stated amount actually
represents non-advanced sums under future advances mortgage); Russell v.Letton, 56 Mo. App.
541, 548 (1894) (mortgagor may execute several notes representing one stated amount absent
fraud); Sparks v. Brown, 33 Mo. App. 505, 508 (1898) (future advances mortgage valid and parol
evidence is admissible to show intent); see also Graham v. Finnerty, 232 S.W. 129, 131 (Mo.
1921) (debt may be secured with separate instruments); White v. Meiderhoff, 281 S.W. 98, 100
(Mo. Ct. App. 1926) (future advances mortgage taken in good faith is not fraudulent as to creditors); Embree v. Roney, 152 Mo. App. 257, 263, 133 S.W. 83, 85 (1910) (mortgage valid even
though it permits debtor to retain possession and control of collateral).
35. 63 Mo. App. at 330; see also Rice Bros. v. Davis, 99 Mo. App. 636, 640, 74 S.W. 431,
432 (1903).
36. See White v. Meiderhoff, 281 S.W. 98, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926).
37. The majority rule is that an obligatory advance "takes its priority from the date of the
original mortgage, and the subsequent creditor is junior to it.... [I]f the advance is optional,
and if the mortgagee has notice when the advance is made that a subsequent creditor has acquired
an interest in the land, then the advance loses its priority to that creditor." NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 9, § 12.7, at 759; see also R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 9, §§ 11.02,
11.03. Missouri may follow the majority approach. See Blackburn, supra note 33, at 227.
38. A construction mortgage frequently is denominated as a construction loan. The mortgage is secured by real property and the improvements to be made on it. A line of credit mortgage
uses some mortgageable property interest to secure a fluctuating debt that has a specified maxi-

mum. Many lenders are currently promoting line of credit second mortgages as an alternative to
bank card revolving credit accounts. A dragnet mortgage secures all debts the mortgagor owes or
may owe to the mortgagee in the future. Other types of future advances transactions include openend mortgages to advance additional funds up to the original balance after the loan is paid down,
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struction mortgage,39 however, neither the courts nor the legislature has established a procedure for resolving priority conflicts between a mortgagee making
such advances and other lienors. A mortgagee who opts out of the new future
advances legislation should be aware of this lack of guidance and should either

choose a technique to assure that no priority conflict arises40 or be willing to
gamble that the courts will favorably resolve any conflict.

1. Construction Mortgages
A construction mortgagee who finances new construction or renovations
may secure his loan with a mortgage on the land and improvements, and stipulate that after the initial advance the funds will be advanced as construction
progresses. 41 This is the most prevalent type of future advances mortgage, and
construction mortgagees typically require this type of arrangement to avoid
problems, such as the mortgagor's absconding with the funds.4 2 Priority conflicts most often arise between a mortgagee who has advanced all or substantially all of the construction funds and one or more unpaid mechanics' lienors.
The latter have a statutory lien on the improvements for the value of materials
and the value of labor contributed
that dates, for priority purposes, from the
43
first visible improvement.
The leading Missouri case resolving conflicting priorities between a construction mortgagee and unpaid mechanics' lienors is H.B. Deal Construction
mortgages to secure indorsements, guarantees, or accommodations of commercial paper. NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.7
39. See notes 44-49 and accompanying text infra.
40. The mortgagee need only search the title to ascertain that there are no intervening
liens, then take a new mortgage to secure the advance. The priority of the new mortgage would
not, however, relate back to the date of the original mortgage.
41. See generally R. KRATOVIL, MODERN REAL ESTATE DOCUMENTATION §§ 410-453
(1975); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, §§ 25.01-.43; Kratovil & Werner, Mortgagesfor
Constructionand the Lien PrioritiesProblem-The "Unobligatory"Advance, 41 TENN. L. REV.
311, 311-14 (1974).
42. The construction mortgagee's security includes the land and improvements. Until the
improvements are completed, the security is inadequate to cover the whole loan; hence it is necessary to assure that the funds are actually used for the purposes for which they were advanced.
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.1, at 703. Other potential problems include: (1) a contract price inadequate to complete construction; (2) delays that increase costs; (3) casualty losses;
(4) problems with the long-term lender; (5) incompetent construction contractors; (6) insolvency,
death, or withdrawal of a general contractor or subcontractor; (7) financial problems of the mortgagor; (8) increases in interest rates; (9) unavailability of material or labor; and (10) inability to
find a long term lender to "take out" the loan after construction. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER,
supra note 9, § 25.03. The construction mortgagee may also be concerned that the funds will be
diverted to other uses or that mechanics and materialmen will not be paid. NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 9, § 12.1, at 703.
43. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Vann Realty Co., 568 S.W.2d 777, 780-81 (Mo.
1978) (en banc); Home Bldg. Corp. v. Ventura Corp., 568 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc); Drilling Serv. Co. v. Baebler, 484 S.W.2d 1, 8-9 (Mo. 1972); H.B. Deal Constr. Co. v.
Labor Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940, 950-51 (Mo. 1967); Byron J. Myers, Inc. v. Bradbury, 595 S.W.2d 724, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Cinco Enters. v. Lake St. Louis Estates Co.,
557 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Boyer Lumber v. Blair, 510 S.W.2d 738, 747 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974); Trout's Invs., Inc. v. Davis, 482 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); St. Louis
Flexicore, Inc. v. Lintzenich, 414 S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
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Co. v. Labor Discount Center, Inc.44 The mortgagor and the construction
mortgagee executed a two million dollar deed of trus 5 to be secured by the
land and all improvements. 46 Fifty thousand dollars was advanced on the date
the deed of trust was signed, but the six remaining advances were disbursed
after the date of the first visible improvements. 47 The Missouri Supreme
Court, relying on sections 429.050 and 429.060, which give mechanics' liens
priority over both prior and subsequent liens, held that the mechanics' lienors
had priority over the entire construction mortgage. 48 The court found that the
construction mortgagee 9 had waived priority as to the land by becoming involved in construction.4
Business-wise lenders have devised several schemes to avoid the operation
of the mechanics' lien statutes. Future mortgagees who wish to be governed by
prior Missouri law50 rather than the new statute may want to utilize one of
44. 418 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. 1967).
45. The lender actually gave up only $1.9 million, which according to the court, was sufficient consideration for a $2 million note and deed of trust. Id. at 946, 949.
46. Id. at 945. The construction loan was executed to build a shopping center. The parties
agreed on a general contract, drawings and specifications, and a clause prohibiting alterations
without specific approval. Special provisions and requirements were executed to deal with unanticipated additions or changes. Id. at 944.
47. Id. at 945. The initial advance, for payment to the general contractor, was given to a
title company, who agreed to hold the funds in escrow until one year after the completion of
construction. All further advances were placed in escrow with the title company to pay for material and labor during construction in accordance with an agreement by the parties. Id. at 946. The
use of escrow accounts is discussed in notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra. The date of the
first visible improvement was when the general contractor began erecting the building and improvements, rather than when surveying and general ground work commenced. Id. at 951-52.
48. Id. at 964. The court concluded that § 429.050 created "a lien in favor of the general
contractor and all other lien claimants whose liens were properly filed . . . [that] attached to the
building and improvements in preference to the prior lien of the deed of trust upon the land." Id.
at 952. The mortgagee argued that the statute should not apply to "construction loan arrangements in which the lender is legally obligated to disburse the proceeds of the construction loan for
the improvement of the property and the mortgage is taken . . . with the expectation that the
improvements to be built thereon will provide a major portion of the security. . . [but will come]
into being as the improvements are made and the loan proceeds are disbursed." The court refused
to draw such an exception and held that the statute specifically referred to all prior liens. Id.
49. Id.; see Magidson v. Stern, 235 Mo. App. 1039, 1055, 148 S.W.2d 144, 153 (1941)
(mortgagee waived priority as to the land by writing checks and paying subcontractors); Comment, The Missouri Mechanics' Lien Statute-Is it Adequate?, 26 Mo. L. REv. 53, 58-59
(1961). Many types of mortgagee conduct may support finding a waiver. See, e.g., Drilling Serv.
Co. v. Baebler, 484 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Mo. 1972) (knowledge and contemplation of employing
mechanics); Byron J. Myers, Inc. v. Bradbury, 595 S.W.2d 724, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(advance knowledge of and direct payment to contractors); Pine Lawn Bank & Trust Co. v.
Schnebelen, 579 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (knowledge of potential liens, and inducing improvements); Cinco Enters. v. Lake St. Louis Estates Co., 557 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) (advance knowledge, and deed of trust contemplated); Trout's Invs., Inc. v. Davis, 482
S.W.2d 510, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (mortgagee assured payment to mechanics); see also
Dreckshage v. Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 555 S.W.2d 314, 323-24 (Mo. 1977) (en
bane) (subrogation agreement executed with second deed of trust). But cf. Herbert & Brooner
Constr. Co. v. Golden, 499 S.W.2d 541, 546-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (although lien waiver was
legally ineffective, mortgagee showed reliance in paying out funds). Mere consent or failure to
object to the construction of improvements does not constitute waiver. Magidson, 235 Mo. App. at
1054, 148 S.W.2d at 153.
50. See notes 96-105 and accompanying text infra.
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these techniques in order to avoid subordination of their mortgages. In the
most popular scheme, the mortgagee hires an escrow agent or title company to
disburse the funds, requiring all subcontractors providing material or labor to
be paid as work progresses and forbidding further advances until such payments are made. 51 Although the Missouri courts have expressly approved this
scheme,5

2

its failure results in the construction mortgagee's subordination to

all unpaid mechanics' lienors. 53
The mechanics' lien statutes also may be avoided if the mortgagee places
all the loan funds in a construction account over which the mortgagee retains
control and which requires specific approval for withdrawals.5 This procedure,
although approved by the courts, 55 is ineffective if mechanics' lienors are not
paid 56 or if the account supervisor lacks the sophistication and experience to
control the account.5 7 In another approach, the mortgagee disguises the future
advances portion of the mortgage by executing and recording a deed of trust
that, on its face, states the total amount of the mortgage and by executing a
second, unrecorded agreement regarding advances. 58 Although no authority
exists, 59 Missouri, like other states, may disregard the absolute language of the
deed of trust 6 0 and admit extrinsic evidence of the second agreement. 61 If the
51. This technique, termed "control of disbursements," allows the mortgagee to supervise
the payment of construction funds and assure that mechanics are paid as their liens arise. NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.1, at 709. Lienors can be paid on the basis of work completed
(progress payments) or only upon presentment of bills or vouchers (voucher payments). Both
methods may be coupled with spot checks to discourage diversion of funds. Id.; see, e.g., H.B.
Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940, 945-46 (Mo. 1967).
52. See Drilling Serv. Co. v. Baebler, 484 S.W.2d 1, 9-10 (Mo. 1972).
53. Unpaid mechanics' lienors have priority over all prior and subsequent liens, including
the construction mortgage. See notes 7-19 & 41-49 and accompanying text supra. The mortgagor
also risks waiving priority as to the land by exercising substantial control over the construction
funds. See note 49 supra.
54. This differs from the title company or escrow agent technique only in that the mortgagee, rather than a third party, retains control over the funds.
55. See, e.g., Dreckshage v. Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 555 S.W.2d 314, 317
(Mo. 1977) (en banc); Trout's Invs., Inc. v. Davis, 482 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
56. If the lienors are not paid, the construction mortgagee will be subordinated as to the
improvements, Mo. RaV. STAT. §§ 429.050-.060 (1978), and possibly as to the land. See notes 719 & 44-49 and accompanying text supra.
57. See, e.g., National Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886, 905, 506 P.2d
20, 30 (1973) (inadequate lender control over construction funds left mechanics unpaid and resulted in subordination). These procedures can be difficult to implement if the general contractor
does not have cash reserves adequate to make payment to the subcontractors and obtain lien
waivers before making his request for payment accompanied by the supporting documentation.
Frequently, the procedure is altered so that the general contractor furnishes lien waivers from
subcontractors to secure the previous progress payment. This way the lien waivers are only one
progress payment behind (minimizing exposure to liens), the contractor's cash flow needs are accommodated, and the construction mortgagee is protected from mechanics' liens through the customary 10% payment holdback.
58. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.7, at 757.
59. See Graham v. Finnerty, 232 S.W. 129, 131 (Mo. 1921); Foster v. Reynolds, 38 Mo.
553, 556-57 (1866); White v. Meiderhoff, 281 S.W. 98, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926); Smith-Wallace
Shoe Co. v. Wilson, 63 Mo. App. 326, 330 (1895). These cases did not decide, however, what the
priority date for such advances would be.
60. The face amount of the mortgage may be rebutted with extrinsic evidence of collateral
agreements. See, e.g., Foster v. Reynolds, 38 Mo. 553, 556-57 (1866); Holmes v. Strayhorn-Hut-
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courts follow this approach, the future advances will be subordinated to
mechanics' liens just as if the transaction had been undisguised.
2. Line of Credit Mortgages
In a line of credit mortgage, which is used more frequently in chattel
transactions than in real estate mortgages, 62 the lender sets a maximum
amount that the debtor, usually a business, can borrow.63 Neither the legislature nor the judiciary has established a method for resolving priority disputes
between intervening liens and advances made pursuant to a line of credit
agreement. The construction mortgage cases are of doubtful precedential value
here. The rationale for subordinating advances in those cases was the strong
legislative policy of protecting mechanics' lienors, 6 ' and no such statutory policy exists in the line of credit area.
The majority rule, which one commentator has suggested that Missouri
would follow, 5 distinguishes obligatory and optional advances.0 6 Obligatory
advances, for priority purposes, relate back to the date of the initial advance
and are superior to liens arising after that date.67 An advance is obligatory if it
is contractually required by the terms of the mortgage. Optional advances, on
the other hand, are subordinated to all intervening liens.6" Some states treat
ton-Evans Comm'n Co., 81 Mo. App. 97, 101 (1899); Williams v. Alnutt, 72 Mo. App. 62, 65
(1897); Russell v. Letton, 56 Mo. App. 541, 548 (1894); Sparks v. Brown, 33 Mo. App. 505, 508
(1888).
61. See, e.g., Wixom v. Ingham, 21 Ariz. App. 65, 67, 515 P.2d 606, 608 (1973) (to show
amount actually loaned); Freese Leasing v. Union Trust & Say. Bank, 253 N.W.2d 921, 924
(Iowa 1977) (to show parties' intent, situation, and antecedent negotiations); Heath Tecna Corp.
v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 609 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Utah 1980) (dicta) (to construe ambiguous
future advances clause).
62. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 22, § 25-4; notes 20-25 and accompanying
text supra.
63. This is the ideal arrangement. The parties may choose, however, not to specify a maximum. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.7, at 757-58.
64. E.g., H.B. Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940, 952 (Mo.

1967).

65.

Blackburn, supra note 33, at 224; see also R.

§ 25.12, at 374 (explains majority rule).

KRATOVIL

& R.

WERNER,

supra note 9,

66. The mortgagee may be contractually obligated to make advances, or make them only
at his option. See Comment, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances: Problemsof Priority and the
Doctrine of Economic Necessity, 46 Miss. L.J. 433, 434 (1975); see also Meek, MortgageProvisions Extending the Lien to FutureAdvances and Antecedent Indebtedness, 26 ARK L. REv. 423,
428-35 (1973); Urban, Future Advances Lending in North Carolina, 13 WAKE FOREsT L. REv.
297, 306-11 (1977); Note, Consumer Law-Limitations on the Validity of Future Advance
Clauses in Mortgage Contracts, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 745, 746-53 (1975).
67. See, e.g., Earnshaw v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 109 N.H. 283, 285, 249 A.2d
675, 676 (1969); House of Carpets v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 85 N.M. 560, 564, 514 P.2d 611, 615
(1973); Central Pa. Say. Ass'n v. Carpenters of Pa., Inc., 298 Pa. Super. 250, -,
444 A.2d
755, 758 (1982); Kemp v. Thurmond, 521 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1975); Western Mortgage
Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 411, 424 P.2d 437, 438-39 (1967). But
cf. S & S Ceiling & Partition Co v. Calvon Corp., 63 Ohio App. 2d 150, 154, 410 N.E.2d 777,
780 (1979) (mortgage not given priority over mechanics' liens unless funds are disbursed in certain sums and under definite conditions).
68. See, e.g., Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 260, 596 P.2d 429, 433
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optional advances to protect security as obligatory69 and grant them superior-

ity, while others refuse to create special rules for such advances.70 The line of
credit mortgagee choosing to follow prior law rather than the new statute

should be aware that unless Missouri adopts the majority rule, the courts may
subordinate even obligatory advances to intervening liens.
3. Dragnet Mortgages
Unlike construction and line of credit mortgages, the dragnet mortgage
usually does not contemplate future advances. 7 ' Dragnet clauses, which appear
in all types of mortgages, secure any and all debts that the mortgagor owes or
may owe to the mortgagee.7 2 It is unclear whether such clauses are valid in
Missouri or whether advances claimed under them will enjoy priority over intervening liens. Most jurisdictions recognize the validity of dragnet clauses but
construe them strictly,7 3 often holding the claimed advance to be unsecured by
the mortgage.74 Even if they find the advances secured, most courts treat them
(1979) (actual notice of other lien and knowledge that advance was optional); S & S Ceiling &
Partition Co. v. Calvon Corp., 63 Ohio App. 2d 150, 154, 410 N.E.2d 777, 780-81 (1971) (maximum amount recited did not create obligation to disburse); Conshohocken Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Period & Country Homes, Inc., 287 Pa. Super. 520, _, 430 A.2d 1173, 1178 (1981)
(no priority for optional advances); National Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886,
889-90, 506 P.2d 20, 28 (1973) (priority dates from optional construction mortgage advance).
Some states require that the mortgagee have notice of the intervening lien for his advance to be
subordinated. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.7, at 759.
69. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.7, at 760; see also Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 443.055.3 (Supp. 1983) (gives priority to advances made for real property taxes, hazard insurance premiums, or condominium maintenance charges) (discussed in notes 112-16 and accompanying text infra).
70. Blackburn, supra note 33, at 220-23; see Raymond Int'l, Inc. v. Realbanc, Inc., 199
Neb. 607, 612, 260 N.W.2d 484, 487 (1977); R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 9,
§ 11.03; Meek, supra note 66, at 428-29; Comment, supra note 66, at 438-41.
71. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.8, at 772.
72. Id.; see Meek, supra note 66 at 429-43; Note, supra note 66, at 748-52; Note, The
Enforceability of "Dragnet Clauses" in Deeds of Trust: The Current State of the Law in Texas,
56 TEX. L. REV. 771, 773-74 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Akamine & Sons, Ltd. v. American Sec. Bank, 50 Hawaii 304, 312, 440
P.2d 262, 267 (1968); Farmers Trust & Say. Bank v. Manning, 311 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa
1981); Freese Leasing v. Union Trust & Say. Bank, 253 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Iowa 1977); Emporia
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Mounkes, 214 Kan. 178, 181, 519 P.2d 618, 621 (1974); Canal Nat'l
Bank v. Becker, 431 A.2d 71, 74 (Me. 1981); Trapp ex reL First Miss. Bank of Commerce v.
Tidwell, 418 So. 2d 786, 792 (Miss. 1982); O'Neill Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Mitchell, 209 Neb. 206,
210, 307 N.W.2d 115, 118 (1981).
74. Courts have seized on a variety of factors to refuse to uphold dragnet clauses. NELSON
& WHITMAN, supranote 9, § 12.8, at 773-75; see, e.g., Uransky v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
I Bankr. 640, 644 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (intent unclear); Underwood v. Jarvis, 358 So. 2d 731, 735
(Ala. 1978) (same); Emporia State Bank & Trust Co. v. Mounkes, 214 Kan. 178, 184, 519 P.2d
618, 623 (1974) (unclear intent and distinct debts); Farmers Trust & Say. Bank v. Manning, 311
N.W.2d 285, 289-90 (Iowa 1981) (advance by only one joint mortgagee); Freese Leasing v. Union
Trust & Say. Bank, 253 N.W.2d 921, 926-27 (Iowa 1977) (unrelated debts and intent unclear);
Canal Nat'l Bank v. Becker, 431 A.2d 71, 74 (Me. 1981) (intent unclear); Trapp ex rel. First
Miss. Bank of Commerce v. Tidwell, 418 So. 2d 786, 792-93 (Miss. 1982) (transferees of property
not warned); O'Neill Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Mitchell, 209 Neb. 206, 210, 307 N.W.2d 115, 119
(1981) (advances to subsequent property owner); Goodfriend v. United Am. Bank, 637 S.W.2d
870, 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (voluntary payment for taxes); First Sec. Bank v. Shiew, 609
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as optional advances by subordinating them to intervening liens.7 It seems
likely that Missouri will follow this approach, especially if the optional-obligatory distinction is adopted.
IV.

NEW LEGISLATION

In 1981, the legislature enacted Missouri Revised Statutes section
443.055,76 which expressly permits the use of future advances clauses in real
estate mortgages and, for priority purposes, dates advances made pursuant to
such clauses as of the date that the original instrument was filed. This legislation permits any lender under a mortgage, deed of trust, or other real property
security instrument to make future advances. The law specifically rejects the
optional-obligatory distinction, and assures the priority of advances for a tenyear period so long as the provisions of the statute are followed.
A.

Operation of the Statute

To be governed by the statute, a mortgage must clearly state on its face
that it secures future advances and must list the total amount that may be
secured thereunder.7 7 The mortgage and its amendments must clearly state
that they will be governed by section 443.055.78 Failure to follow these requirements will place the mortgage under the control of prior Missouri law.7 9
Mortgages under section 443.055 secure optional and obligatory advances, so long as the total indebtedness after the advance does not exceed the
face amount of the mortgage or any applicable amendment.80 Advances made
for the reasonable protection of security and advances made under a construcP.2d 952, 957 (Utah 1980) (agreement not negotiated, different type of transaction, and second
agreement did not refer back). But cf. Kamaole Resort Twenty-One v. Ficke Hawaiian Inv., 60
Hawaii 413, 427, 591 P.2d 104, 112 (1979) (valid when specifically referred back); Creech v.
LaPorte Prod. Credit Ass'n, 419 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (in agreement); First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lygrisse, 213 Kan. 595, 602, 647 P.2d 1268, 1273 (1982) (antecedent
debts specifically covered); Overland Park Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Braden, 6 Kan. App. 2d 876,
__, 636 P.2d 797, 802 (1981) (unpaid closing costs secured as future advance); State Bank of
Albany v. Fioravanti, 51 N.Y.2d 638, 646-47, 417 N.E.2d 60, 64, 435 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (1980)
(subsequent grantee subject to dragnet clause).
75. See, e.g., Akamine & Sons, Ltd. v. American Sec. Bank, 50 Hawaii 304, 312, 440
P.2d 262, 268 (1968) (debts of different kind or quality will not relate back). But cf. ITT Indus.
Credit Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 615 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (dicta) (subsequent
lender has duty to check); New Mex. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lucas Bros., 92 N.M. 2, 4, 582 P.2d
379, 382 (1978) (advances relate back to recorded dragnet clause).
76. (Supp. 1983). 1982 Mo. Laws 621.
77. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.055.2 (Supp. 1983); see also MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 7-102 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§6 60.04.210-.220 (Supp. 1983).
78. Section 443.055.8 states: "The provisions of this section shall not govern any instrument or any supplement or amendment to an instrument unless such instrument, supplement or
amendment shall clearly state on its face that it is to be governed by this section."
79. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 443.055.2, .8 (Supp. 1983).
80. Id. § 443.055.2. Advances exceeding the amount stated in the agreement are
unsecured.
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tion mortgage to permit the completion of construction, 1 however, are secured

even though the total
indebtedness after the advance exceeds the face amount
82
of the mortgage.

All advances secured by a mortgage under the statute have priority from
the time the mortgage is filed, irrespective of whether those advances were
optional or obligatory, so long as they do not exceed the face amount of the
mortgage.8 3 In addition, advances made to protect security or permit the completion of construction date from the time the mortgage is recorded, even if
they exceed the mortgage amount.84 If an amendment has increased the total
amount to be secured, however, any advance exceeding the face amount of the
mortgage dates from the time the amendment was recorded. 85
Neither the original mortgage nor its amendments may secure advances
made more than ten years after the date of the mortgage.8 ' During that tenyear period, the mortgagor and the mortgagee may not execute any other
mortgage securing future advances with the real estate described in the mortgage previously recorded.87 A proper future advances mortgage, by operation
of the statute, secures only contractual obligations; tort liability and other noncontractual indebtedness do not fall within the scope of permissible advances.8 8
81. Such an advance might be made where an uninsured casualty loss is incurred. Rather
than write the loan off, the mortgagee would lend additional funds to restore the security.
82. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.055.3 (Supp. 1983). A majority of states adopt this by common
law, treating such advances as obligatory and granting them priority over intervening liens. See
notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra. Although not clear from the statute, advances should
not be secured if the mortgage contains no future advances clause.
83. Id. § 443.055.6. This section gives priority to the advancing mortgagee regardless of
whether third parties have actual notice of the advances. Advances in excess of the face amount of
the mortgage should be unsecured only to the extent of the surplus. Section 443.055.2 provides
that "the total amount . . . may decrease or increase." This indicates that surplus advances
should become secured as the mortgage is paid down, with priority dating back to the date of the
mortgage. The "total amount" refers to the balance at any given time, rather than to an absolute
maximum determined as of the date of the mortgage.
84. Id. § 443.055.6.
85. Id. Advances exceeding the amount of the amendment are secured, and paying down
an advance to the amount stated in the amendment secures the excess, giving it priority over liens
attaching after the advance. It is unclear whether paying down the mortgage after the advance
permitted by amendment insures that the mortgagee's priority in surplus advances will relate back
to the mortgage recording date. When the parties have a relationship characterized by mutual
trust such that the mortgagee need not worry about intervening liens, there may be no need to file
an amendment.
86. Id. § 443.055.2. The mortgagor could still hold the mortgagee personally liable on the
debt even though the late advance is unsecured. If the debt is to remain outstanding longer than
ten years and advances will be made, the best procedure may be to search title and execute a new
mortgage each time an advance is made.
87. Id. § 443.055.5. A second agreement is invalid only to the extent that it secures future
advances. It does not invalidate the original agreement, even to the extent of the future advances
clause. See id. The mortgagee may be able to execute a valid second future advances mortgage
with a joint tenant or a tenant in common with the mortgagor who was not a party to the original
future advance. mortgage. The statute should also permit the mortgagor and mortgagee to enter
into a second agreement after the termination of the original future advances clauses because the
restriction applies only "during the life of a previous agreement concerning the same real property." Id.
88. Id. § 443.055.4. This section also prevents such agreements to act as a lien for the
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Further, the mortgagee may not make any advances after the receipt of a
termination statement.89 Advances made after receipt of a termination statement, non-contractual advances, advances under a second mortgage covering
the same real estate, advances made more than ten years after the mortgage
are unsecured, and agreements permitting such advances are invalid and
unenforceable 0
A mortgagor may terminate the security of future advances in the mortgage by sending proper notice to the mortgagee.9 1 Within ten days after the
receipt of such notice, the mortgagee must record a termination statement listing the total amount owing under the mortgage. 92 Failure to properly record
irrevocably binds the mortgagee to the total amount of indebtedness stated in
any similar statement that the mortgagor files.93 Advances made after the
94
mortgagee's receipt of a termination notice are not secured.
B. Effect of the Statute
Section 443.055 merely restates present mortgage law insofar as it permits future advances mortgages. The similarities end there, however. The new
legislation either completely reverses or else does not affect the priority rules
between construction mortgagees and mechanics' lienors, creates a set of priority rules to govern line of credit and dragnet mortgages, and sets up a practical solution for advances necessary to protect security. In addition, the statute
generously allows mortgagees the choice between following the statutory
guidelines or ignoring those mandates, thereby being governed by the common
law as it existed before the statute or as it may develop.9 5 The mortgagee's
payment of any noncontractual relationship.
89. Id. § 443.055.7
90. Id. §§ 443.055.2, .3, .5, .7. These agreements are probably invalid even as between the
parties, given the "invalid and unenforceable" language in these sections.
91. Section 443.055.7 provides:
At any time subsequent to the execution of an instrument, the borrower may send a
notice to the lender by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal delivery
to the lender or an authorized agent thereof ... that the borrower elects to terminate
the operation of the instrument as security for future advances or future obligations
made or incurred after the date the lender receives the notice....
92. Section 443.055.7 provides:
Within ten days of its receipt of such a notice, the lender shall at its own cost file of
record in the public office in which the original instrument was recorded a statement
referring to the original instrument, legally describing the real property therein, setting
forth the fact of its receipt of the borrowers notice, stating the date of its receipt of such
notice, and stating the total principal amount as of the date it received the borrower's
notice of all outstanding debts and obligations secured by the instrument.
93. Id. If the mortgagee fails to record, the mortgagor may do so and bind the mortgagee
to the amount stated, "so long as the borrower's statement is made in good faith." Id.
94. Id.
95. The mortgagee apparently makes an irrevocable election between the common law and
the statute because: (1) the statute does not expressly entitle the document to be amended for any
purpose other than to increase the total amount secured; (2) the mortgagee is not given the statutory right to terminate-the provision must be included in the document; and (3) the statute does
not expressly permit the parties to later change the applicable law. See id. §§ 443.055.6-.7.
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choice depends on the purposes of the mortgage, the length of time needed for
advances, and many other individual factors.
1. Construction Mortgages
The priority rules of the new statute conflict with sections 429.055 and
429.060, which grant mechanics' lienors priority as to the improvements for
which they contributed labor or capital. Good arguments exist for applying
either law to resolve priority disputes between construction mortgagees and
mechanics' lienors. The legislature, however, neither expressly stipulated
which would apply nor expressly overruled H.B.
Dea 9 6 and its progeny. The
97
mechanics' lien sthtute will likely still control.
The Missouri Supreme Court has broadly protected mechanics' lienors,
relying on a strong statutorily expressed policy.98 It seems unlikely that this
judicial attitude will be reversed absent strong legislative directive, which is
not present here. The new legislation, unlike the mechanics' lien statute, 99 does
not differentiate between the lien on the improvements and the lien on the
land. In such a situation, the general rule of construction is that the more
specific statute controls."' 0 Without the mechanics' lien statute, mechanics'
lienors would be totally unprotected. A lien on the improvements is the only
method for a mechanic or materialman to recover the value of his labor or
materials.
If the new statute is literally interpreted, the mechanics' lienor will be left
totally unprotected since the construction mortgage usually can only be satisfied by foreclosing on the land and the improvements. 101 If the mechanics' lien
statute controls, the construction mortgagee who participates in or encourages
construction will be considered to have waived priority to the land under H.B.
DeaL102 Further, if this is the resolution of the conflict, the new statute will
have no impact on construction mortgage law vis-a-vis mechanics' lienors ex96. H.B. Deal and later cases granted mechanics' lienholders priority over construction
mortgage advances. See notes 44-49 and accompanying text supra.
97. The result is that a mechanics' lien arising from the construction funded by the construction mortgage will be prior (as to the improvements) to any mortgage on the land alone and
prior (as to the land and improvements) to the construction mortgage under which the advances
are made.

Suppose that X has mortgaged vacant land to A and then receives a construction mortgage
from B under which advances are to be made. An unpaid mechanic, M, could have a lien prior to
A and B as to the improvements and prior to B as to the land and improvements if B waives
priority through participating in the construction. See H.B. Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount
Center, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940, 952-53 (Mo. 1967).
98. See, e.g., Drilling Serv. Co. v. Baebler, 484 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo. 1972).
99. Mechanics' liens are superior to prior mortgages only as to the buildings, erections, or

improvements for which materials or work were furnished, Mo. REV. STAT. § 429.050 (1978),
but they are preferred over subsequent mortgages as to the land and improvements. Id. § 429.060.
100.

Veal v. City of St. Louis, 365 Mo. 836, 843, 289 S.W.2d 7, 12 (1956); State ex rel.

Chi., R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 441 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
101. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.7, at 760-61.
102.

418 S.W.2d at 952-53.
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cept insofar 03as it permits optional advances to allow the completion of
construction.2
On the other hand, the new statute may be considered dominant in the
construction mortgage situation. First, it expressly applies to all mortgages,
deeds of trust, and other real property security instruments. 1°4 No exceptions
are provided for any type of competing lien. Second, the statute expressly permits mortgages to secure future advances necessary to allow the completion of
construction and dates the priority of those advances as of the date the mortgage is recorded. 10 5 This indicates that construction mortgages are not exempt
from the statute or its priority rules.
Given the uncertainty as to which law will apply, a construction mortgagee should utilize an escrow, construction account, or similar method to assure
that mechanics are paid before their statutory liens attach and thereby protect
against a holding that the mechanics' lien statute is controlling. The requirements of the new law are easily met, requiring only administrative changes in
form and procedure. A construction mortgagee who complies with the new
statute will probably be in a more secure position. Compliance with the statute
will insure the validity of the mortgage insofar as it secures future advances; a
complying mortgage and advances thereunder will be given priority over other
intervening liens. Finally, the new statute may be held superior to the mechanics' lien statute, giving a complying construction mortgage and all advances
priority over all mechanics' liens.
2. Line of Credit Mortgages
No Missouri court decision or prior statute sets out a technique for resolving priority disputes between advances under line of credit mortgages and intervening liens. The new legislation, which applies to line of credit mortgages,108 allows a mortgagee to secure future advances under such a mortgage
and locks in the priority of those advances on the date that the mortgage is
recorded. Unless the mortgage secures advances for more than a ten-year period,107 a line of credit mortgagee should choose to be controlled by the new
legislation. A mortgagee who chooses to be governed by the common law runs
the risk that the courts will reject the majority rule and subordinate all advances, whether obligatory or optional, or follow the majority rule, which assures superior priority for only obligatory advances, and subordinate the advance in question by labelling it as optional.10 8
103. Under § 443.055.3, optional advances relate back to the original mortgage even if they
exceed the face amount of the mortgage. Under prior law, such an advance would have been
unsecured.
104. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.055.1 (Supp. 1983).
105. Id. §§ 443.055.3, .6.
106. The statute applies to all real property mortgages. Id. § 443.055.1.
107. Advances can be secured for a maximum of ten years. Id. § 443.055.2.
108. The statute implies that Missouri cases had followed the majority rule because it expressly applies to optional and obligatory advances. See id. §§ 443.055.2, .6.
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3. Dragnet Mortgages

As with line of credit mortgages, neither statutes nor decisions previously
offered an answer to the validity of dragnet clauses or the priority of advances
under such clauses. The new legislation, however, provides a procedure to deal
with dragnet clauses. Any instrument under the statute must state that it
secures future advances and must set out the total amount secured. 10 9 Thus,
prior indebtedness cannot be secured by a dragnet mortgage. Likewise, unanticipated advances will not be secured by a dragnet clause because advance
consideration is required for compliance with the requirements of setting out
the amount and terms of the mortgage. A mortgagee who previously complies
with the technical requirements, however, can secure even unanticipated advances by filing a proper amendment increasing the total indebtedness to be
secured, but those advances will take priority only from the time the amendment is recorded. 110 A mortgagee who seriously intends to utilize a dragnet
clause may be better off under the new legislation given the absence of common law and the possibility that the courts will hold that the clause does not
secure the particular advance. A mortgagee who includes such a clause but
does not really anticipate utilizing it may be unable to take advantage of the
statute, however, if he does not follow its requirements from the outset."1
4. Advances to Protect Security
Prior to the new statute, advances to protect security were neither
approved nor disapproved. Under Missouri Revised Statutes sections
443.055.3112 and 443.055.6,113 however, advances to protect security and ad-

vances to allow the completion of construction are permitted and they relate
back, for priority purposes, to the date of the initial mortgage whether or not
they exceed the face amount of the mortgage. Because a mortgage must indicate an intent to be governed by the statute, 11 4 advances to protect security or
to allow the completion of construction under non-complying mortgages will
not be governed by section 443.055. Therefore, a mortgagee who must make
such advances but has not executed a mortgage that complies with the statute
cannot be certain that his advance will be secured, especially if the mortgage
does not contain a future advances clause at all, and, if so, cannot be certain
that the advance will relate back for priority."1 If the need arises, the non109. Id. § 443.055.2.
110. Id. § 443.055.6.
111. It seems that a mortgagee makes an irrevocable election when the mortgage is executed. See note 95 supra. The only alternative is to execute a second mortgage securing the unanticipated loan. But cf id. § 443.055.5 (same realty cannot secure a subsequent future advances
mortgage).
112. (Supp. 1983).
113. (Supp. 1983).
114. See note 78 supra.
115. Section 443.055.3 shows that the legislature intended to permit advances to protect
security and allow the completion of construction and protect their priority in all mortgages,

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 11

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

complying mortgagee may have no choice but to make the advance and argue
its validity and priority against any conflicting lien.116
5. UCC Security Interests
The new legislation applies only to real estate mortgages 17 and has no
application to liens arising under Article 9. Only in the fixtures area does the
statute have any possible relevance, because fixtures are controlled by both the
UCC and real estate law. If any conflict arises between the UCC and the
statute, however, the UCC likely will control.-First, the UCC specifically controls when its provisions conflict with another statute. 1 8 Second, even in the
fixtures area, the UCC defers to real estate law only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the goods in question are fixtures."" Finally, the UCC sets out
the requirements for a fixture filing120 and devises a scheme for resolving priority disputes1 21 between fixture interests and other liens, which indicate that
perfection and priority-the two areas of potential conflict-are to be controlled by the UCC.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the new legislation is workable and practical, it leaves a number
of questions unanswered. The statute offers most mortgagees an effective technique to secure future advances and be assured of their priority. Whether a
mortgagee should choose to be governed by the new statute depends on the
circumstances surrounding the transaction and the length of time needed for
advances. A construction mortgagee should be aware of the conflict between
section 443.055 and the mechanics' lien statute, and should prepare for the
possibility that mechanics' liens may take priority over his advances. Even
with that possibility, a construction mortgagee likely will be in a better position under the new statute. If non-complying mortgages are executed, line of
credit and dragnet mortgagees should realize that their advances may be subordinated to intervening liens.
RITA CARPER SOWARDS

whether or not they contain future advances clauses. A problem arose, however, when § 443.055.8
was added in 1982, excluding mortgages that do not opt-in under the statute. The problem is
resolved by finding that such advances are always secured and always relate back; the only issue

should be whether the advance was necessary to protect the security or to complete construction.
116. The mortgagee may be forced to make the advance to protect its security. See NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 9, § 12.7, at 765-66.
117. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.055.1 (Supp. 1983).
118. See id. §8 400.1-103, -104 (1978).
119. See id. § 400.9-313(1); see also Henning, supra note 26, at 65.
120. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-408(3) (1978).
121. Id. § 400.9-313(3).
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